Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The impact of economic policy decisions depends, to a great extent, on how they are communicated and aect agents' expectations, and hence their actions. Indeed, private agents can form expectations about the future course of scal policy by combining information conveyed by government announcements and privately collected information. In an economic system with dispersed information where the government has potentially superior information on its procedures, forecasts and policy plans, policymakers can coordinate private agents' beliefs and reduce disagreement by releasing additional information about current and future policies. This paper focuses on the expectation coordination eects of scal policy communication and provides an empirical assessment of the implications of disagreement amongst agents for the transmission of scal impulses in the United States. We develop an indirect measure of precision of scal policy communication derived from forecasters' disagreement on the future path of federal scal spending, based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The underlying intuition is that a clear scal policy communication can coalesce private sector expectations on future policy measures, which in turn reduces agents' disagreement. Based on this, we formulate our empirical strategy consistently with the implications of imperfect information models (see Mankiw and Reis, 2002 , Woodford, 2002 , Sims, 2003 and Reis, 2006a by structuring it in the three following steps.
First, in order to pin down the uctuations in disagreement that are due to policy communication and not to cyclical macroeconomic disturbances, we project the cross sectional dispersion of forecasts about future government spending onto the disagreement about current output. Second, following Ricco (2015) , we identify scal spending shocks using individual revision of expectations at dierent horizons in US Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data which we name`scal news'. In doing this, we recognise that the presence of information frictions crucially modies the econometric identication problem of scal shocks.
1 Third,
we estimate an Expectational Threshold VAR (ETVAR) model using Bayesian techniques, where the proxies for scal news shocks are included together with a number of macroeconomic variables. The threshold variable is our disagreement index, and the threshold level is endogenously estimated.
Our results provide evidence that, during periods of high disagreement on scal policy, spending shocks have weak eects on the economy. Conversely, in periods of low disagreement, the output response to the spending news shock is positive, strong and signicantly dierent from zero, reaching a cumulative medium-term multiplier of about 2.7 after 16
quarters. Our analysis also shows that the stronger stimulative eects in times of low disagreement are mainly the result of an accelerator eect of planned scal spending on investment. During the low disagreement regime, the Federal Reserve tends to be more reactive to spending increases than in periods of high disagreement. Overall, our analysis highlights the case for policy signalling as a tool to reduce disagreement and enhance the impact of spending shocks.
Our results speak to the literature on scal foresight (see Ramey, 2011a , Leeper et al., 2012 and Leeper et al., 2013 , and on state-dependent eects of scal policy (see, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012 , Owyang et al., 2013 and Caggiano et al., 2014 .
However, dierently from these works, our paper connects to the recent literature on imperfect information and on the formation of economic expectations (see, amongst others, Mankiw et al., 2004 , Dovern et al., 2012 , Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010 , 2012 In the presence of imperfect information, new information is only partially absorbed over time. Therefore, average forecast errors are likely to be a combination of both current and past structural shocks and cannot be thought of as being, per se, a good proxy for structural innovations (as, for example, proposed in Ramey, 2011a) . 4 and Le Bihan, 2013 and Andrade et al., 2014) . In fact, we employ an identication scheme of scal shocks that is coherent with the implications of imperfect information models and use expectational data in order to study the eects of disagreement amongst agents. Importantly, we focus on the role of public signals in reducing disagreement and in coordinating expectations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical attempt to study how dierent levels of precisions in scal policy communication aect the transmission mechanism of scal shocks, through disagreement.
In doing that we also relate to the literature on policy communication. The analysis of the trade-os underlying the provision of public signals by policy-makers to an economy in which agents have dispersed information was pioneered by Morris and Shin (2003a,b) in the context of monetary policy. 2 Dierently from this literature, our paper focuses on scal policy and provides stylised empirical facts on the implication of increased transparency, without studying the relation between public and private signal from a welfare perspective.
In this respect, it is more closely related to Melosi (2012) that proposes an econometric study of a signalling channel of monetary policy.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the properties of expectational data on US scal spending. Section 3 is devoted to the construction of the scal policy disagreement index used in this paper. Section 4 comments on the identication of scal shocks. Section 5 illustrates our Bayesian Threshold VAR model. Section 6 presents our main results and provides insights on the transmission channels. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 More recent theoretical contributions have been proposed, amongst others, by Angeletos et al. (2006) , Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) , Hachem and Wu (2014) , Frenkel and Kartik (2015) .
2 Forecasting Fiscal Spending
In the Philadelphia Fed's quarterly SPF, professional forecasters are asked to provide expected values of a set of 32 macroeconomic variables for both the present quarter (nowcast) and up to four quarters ahead (forecast). SPF forecasters do not know the current value of these macroeconomic variables, which are only released with a lag. The panelists' information set includes the BEA's advance report data, which contains the rst estimate of GDP (and its components) for the previous quarter. The deadline for responses is the second to third week of the middle month of each quarter. Some features of the SPF's survey data on scal spending are noteworthy and common to the forecasts of other macroeconomic variables. As is evident in Figure 1 , expectations about scal spending are more stable than the actual series. Expectations are sluggish in that they typically underestimate the movements of the forecast variable, despite being able to capture low frequency movements. Moreover, experts' forecasts exhibit predictable errors and can be Granger-predicted (see Ricco, 2015) . Experts disagree as they report dierent predictions at dierent forecast horizons and when updating their forecasts. The extent of their disagreement evolves over time (see Figure 1 and discussion in Section 4). Finally, 3 The Survey does not report the number of experts involved in each forecast or the forecasting method used. Professional forecasters are mostly private rms in the nancial sector. On average, in the sample, there are 29 respondents per period of which 22 appear in consecutive periods. forecast revisions at dierent horizons for a given event in time are positively correlated.
The above facts are broadly consistent with professional forecasters' data being generated in a model of imperfect information rational expectations. In fact, imperfect information models in the form of delayed-information or noisy-information are able to account for at least three important features of expectational data: the presence of disagreement, the forecastability of errors, and the autocorrelation of expectation revisions. As shown by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) , the latter can be used to evaluate the implied degree of information rigidity. 4 In our sample, the serial correlation between forecast revisions is around 0.2, implying a degree of information rigidity of 0.8. We propose an index of precision of scal policy communication derived from the forecasters' disagreement on the future path of scal spending. The underlying intuition is that a clear scal policy communication can coalesce private sector expectations on future policy measures, which in turn reduces agents' disagreement. Conversely, higher than average disagreement about future government spending reveals poor communication from the government about the future stance of scal policies.
Developing this idea, we focus on the component of the disagreement among forecasters about the future federal spending developments that is orthogonal to the disagreement about current macroeconomic conditions. The resulting index has three main features: (1) it relies on expectational real time ex-ante data only; (2) it is linearly uncorrelated with the business cycle; (3) it is fully non-judgmental. Moreover, it is consistent with our denition of scal shocks that are extracted from the same expectational dataset, and on a similar time horizon.
To construct the index for scal policy disagreement, a two-step procedure is followed.
First, the time-varying cross-sectional standard deviation of the SPF forecasts (disagreement) for real federal government spending is computed at the four-quarters horizon. Second, the component of disagreement related to discretionary policy is extracted by projecting the disagreement among forecasters about the future development of scal spending onto the disagreement about the current macroeconomic conditions. This is done in order to address the issue of exogeneity with respect to the macroeconomic cycle. We think of this component as aected by the policy communication regime.
We justify this procedure (i) theoretically, using a simple noisy-information model to discuss under which assumptions the index obtained could be correctly thought of as an approximation of the agents' disagreement about the discretionary scal spending and (ii) empirically, matching this index with a historical narrative.
Disagreement in a Stylised Noisy-information Model
A simple noisy-information model with Bayesian learning can help in more precisely dening the concepts used and in clarifying the assumptions underlying our approach. A stylised reduced form equation that decomposes government spending into a discretionary component and an automatic one can be written as
where µ g is a constant, g d t is the discretionary component of scal spending and the term κy t−1 represent the (lagged) systematic response of scal spending to business cycle uctuations. Similarly to Lahiri and Sheng (2010) , we assume that each agent i, at each quarter t, receives a public signal from the policymaker that is informative about the future growth of discretionary scal spending, g d t+h , at horizon h
Agents complement the information carried by the public signal using other sources of information. That is, they receive a private signal or a signal obtained by random sampling from diuse information publicly available, i.e.,
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the public and the private signals are inde- 
The disagreement at time t amongst forecasters about discretionary scal spending at time t + h can be dened as:
where g i,t+h is the individual forecast dened in equation (4). From Eq. (5), it is clear that when the precision of the public signal (the inverse of its variance) goes to innity, the disagreement amongst agents goes to zero. Therefore, variations in the precision of the public signal are reected in the variations of agents' disagreement over time. We think of the variance of the public signal on discretionary spending as dependent on the willingness of the policymaker to blur or clarify the policy indication, as well as the policymaker's credibility.
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In our empirical analysis, we conceive the policy communication as roughly having twò polar' regimes: high and low precision. While uctuations of disagreement may be due to the endogenous dynamics of absorption of new information, as suggested by delayed-information models, we think of shifts in disagreement as a reection of policy communication regimes.
Cyclical Variations in Disagreement
In order to pin down uctuations in government spending disagreement that are due to policy communication and not due to cyclical macroeconomic disturbances, we need to control for variations of disagreement along the business cycle. In fact, it has been documented that disagreement about GDP growth strongly intensies during recessions and reduces during expansions (see Dovern et al., 2012) . For a linearised reduced form equation for output of the following form, which we might think as derived from a structural model
where the rst sum is an autoregressive component of output up to lag n, the second is the sum of the output responses to the path of scal spending up to horizon m (the maximum horizon on which the government is able to release information) and a t is a combination of macroeconomic shocks. The disagreement about total government spending (the observed quantity) is
Hence, by regressing the disagreement amongst forecasters about the future development of scal spending onto the disagreement about current macroeconomic conditions, one can extract a measure of disagreement about discretionary policy measures.
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In light of the considerations made above, we regress the disagreement of the forecasts 6 Regressing D t (g t+1 ) onto D t (y t ) can generate an endogeneity issue due to the fact that the residual in Eq. 7 may be correlated with the regressor. However, for our purpose, the bias introduced is likely to be small. A simple dimensional argument provides the intuition for this. Regressing log(D t (g t+1 )) onto on real government spending for the four quarters ahead -measured as the log of the crosssectional standard deviation -on the log-disagreement of the forecasts on current GDP, its lags, and a constant. In doing this, we assume that forecasts of future government spending do not incorporate information about other macroeconomic shocks aecting future but not current GDP. Our scal policy disagreement index is thus obtained by exponentiating and standardising the regression residuals. By construction, these residuals are linearly uncorrelated with the disagreement about current macroeconomic conditions. log(D t (y t )), one would nd
We can assess the order of magnitude of the second term observing that -based on SPF historical data -the ratio of disagreement on current output over disagreement on future government spending is around . Hence, we conclude that the bias is at most of order 10 −2 , while κ 2 is likely to be of order one.
7 As a robustness check, we have also added the dispersion of the forecasts on current unemployment and CPI ination to the regressors. Results (not shown, available upon request) are broadly unchanged. 
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Fiscal News
We identify scal shocks using SPF forecast revisions of federal government consumption and investment forecasts, which can be thought of as scal news. The h quarters ahead forecast error can be decomposed into the ow of scal news, which updates the agents' information set I t over time:
forecast revision (news at t-h+1) ∈ I t−h+1
.
13 where E * is the agents' expectation operator and g is government spending growth. The rst term on the right-hand side corresponds to the nowcast error, which can be thought of as a proxy for agents' misexpectations which can be revealed only at a later date (at least after a quarter). The other components (nowcast and forecast revisions) can be seen as proxies for the scal news, which are related to current and future realisations of scal spending, and are received by the agents and incorporated into their expectations. We dene two measures of scal news in the aggregate economy that are both related to the revision of expectations of the government spending growth rate in the current quarter and in the future 3 quarters (the maximum horizon available in the data):
SPF Implied News
where i is the index of individual forecasters. Figure 3 plots the mean implied SPF news on the current quarter and for future quarters, together with forecaster disagreement up to one standard deviation. In the empirical analysis which follows, we use these two news measures, labelled as nowcast revision (equation 10) and forecast revision (equation 11),
respectively.
The identication of scal shocks using expectation revisions is consistent with an imperfect information framework. As observed in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) , in more general models of imperfect information, the average ex-post forecast errors across agents and the average ex-ante forecast revisions are related by the following expression:
where λ is the parameter of information rigidity (λ = 0 in the case of full information), E * t−h x t is the average forecast at time t − h, and u t−h+1,t is a linear combination of rational expectations errors from time t − h to time t. Hence, conditional on the past information set, the revision of expectations is informative about structural innovations. In fact, from Equation (12) one readily obtains:
In particular, we will think of the parameter of information rigidity related to scal spending as having two possible values, λ L and λ H , reecting the policy communication regime.
A Bayesian Threshold VAR
In order to study the eects of policy communication in the transmission of scal shocks, we estimate a Threshold Vector-Autoregressive (TVAR) model with two endogenous regimes.
In the TVAR model, regimes are dened with respect to the level of our scal spending disagreement index (high and low disagreement). A threshold VAR is well suited to provide stylised facts about the signalling eects of scal policy and to capture dierence in regimes with high and low disagreement. Moreover, the possibility of regime shifts after the spending shock allow us to account for possible dependency of the propagation mechanism on the size and the sign of the shock itself. Following Tsay (1998), a two-regime TVAR model can be dened as
where Θ(x) is an Heaviside step function, i.e. a discontinuous function whose value is zero for a negative argument and one for a positive argument. The TVAR model allows for the possibility of two regimes (high and low disagreement), with dierent dynamic coecients We estimate the TVAR model using Bayesian technique and the standard Minnesota and sum-of-coecients prior proposed in the macroeconomic literature. The adoption of these priors has been shown to improve the forecasting performance of VAR models, eectively reducing the estimation error while introducing only relatively small biases in the estimates of the parameters (e.g., Banbura et al., 2010 ).
The TVAR model specied in Eq. (14) 
are assumed to be Gaussian, and the Bayesian priors are conjugate prior distributions, the Maximum Likelihood estimators can be obtained by using least squares. The threshold parameter can be estimated, using non-informative at priors, aŝ
where L is the Gaussian likelihood (see Hansen and Seo, 2002) . Details on the Bayesian priors adopted, on the criteria applied for the choice of the hyperparameters and on the estimation procedure are provided in the appendix.
Our baseline TVAR model includes the SPF implied scal news, the mean SPF forecast of GDP growth for the current quarter and four quarters ahead, the scal policy disagreement index, federal government spending, the Barro-Redlick marginal tax rate 9 , total private consumption and investment, real GDP and the Federal Fund Rate. We use quarterly data 9 The marginal tax rate is originally produced at the annual frequency by Barro and Redlick (2009) , based on the NBER's TAXSIM model (see website). To generate data at the quarterly frequency we have applied the Litterman (1983)'s random walk Markov temporal disaggregation model -which is a renement of Chow and Lin (1971) that allows to avoid step changes due to serial correlation in the regression's residuals -using as indicators quarterly data on GDP, prices and tax receipts. from 1981Q3 to 2012Q4 in real log per capita levels for all variables except those expressed in rates (see appendix for data description).
In order to identify scal news shocks inside our model, we assume that discretionary scal policy does not respond to macroeconomic variables within a quarter. We also assume that agents observe only lagged values of macroeconomic variables and that, in forecasting future government spending, they incorporate the discretionary policy response to the expected output. Finally, we assume that there are no shocks to future realisations of output not aecting its current realisation (e.g., technology or demand shocks) that are foreseen by the policymakers and to which the government can react. These assumptions allow for a recursive identication of the scal shocks in which the scal variables are ordered as follow
and Y t is a vector containing the macroeconomic variables of interest. Results are robust to ordering expectations about future output before scal news related to future quarters.
It is worth stressing that this ordering is consistent with the structure of expectation revisions delivered by models of imperfect information (see equation 13). Indeed, the VAR structure controls for past expectations revisions for a given event in time, isolating the contemporaneous structural shocks from components due to the slow absorption of information.
6 Disagreement and the Transmission of Fiscal Shocks Figure 10 reports the impulse responses to the 3-quarter ahead scal news shock, formalised in equation 11, and generated by the 11-variables TVAR described in equation 14.
Indeed, our main objects of interest are the news shocks related to future changes to government spending. In fact, given the more extended time lag between news and the actual implementation of the policy change, these shocks are more likely to be aected by policy communication than the nowcast revisions. 10 The responses are`intra-regime' IRFs, i.e, computed assuming no transition between regimes.
In order to facilitate the comparison between the two regimes, the impulse responses have been normalised to have a unitary increase in federal spending at the 4-quarters horizon.
Also, the IRFs of the variables in log-levels have been re-scaled by multiplying them by While the response of federal spending to the policy announcement is similar across the two regimes, the TVAR results reveal a very dierent transmission mechanism in the two regimes. The GDP response is always signicant in the L-D regime and higher than in the H-D regime for at least three quarters after the shock. We also compute cumulative medium-run output multipliers, dened as the ratio between the sum of the GDP impulse responses up to the selected horizon (here, at horizon 16 quarters), and the corresponding sum of the responses for federal spending (see also Ilzetzki et al., 2013) . The cumulative 10 The forecast revisions are also of particular interest because their time horizon is likely to include the shocks relative to budgetary news (usually impacting a period of one year, i.e., four quarters). Funds Rate. This may be explained by the willingness of the Fed to react to the potential inationary pressure to the announced extra spending. This seems to reect a response to the boost in demand observed following the news shock. Finally, our index of policy disagreement tends to decrease in the short-run after the news shock, and especially so in the low disagreement regime. This may be due to the release of information about the scal measure, which help to coordinate expectations and has the eect of dissipating the disagreement built-up in the policy debate prior to the announcement (as can also be inferred from Figure 2 ).
The evidence reported in Figure 10 highlights relevant dierences between the responses under the two regimes, thus conrming the importance of taking into account the degree of disagreement about future policies when analysing the transmission mechanism of spending shocks.
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Exploring the Transmission Channels
In this section, we further explore the transmission channels of the scal spending shocks in the two regimes. In particular, we complement the baseline model with additional variables that are added to the model following a`marginal approach'.
The rst chart of Figure In the appendix, we also provide results for a robustness exercise carried out by varying the threshold level in an interval that excludes the higher and lower 30% observations of the threshold variable, i.e., the disagreement index. These exercise shows that the dierent eects stemming from the two communication regimes are conrmed when using alternative values for the disagreement threshold. responses appear broadly similar, and not statistically dierent from zero, in the two regimes.
These results provide additional evidence of the presence of an accelerator eect of planned scal spending on investment in times characterised by less disagreement. The private sector appears to be willing to scale up investment and inventories to accommodate the future increase in public demand. The observed persistent growth of federal spending is important in order to explain this behaviour.
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The response of prices, based on both CPI ination and GDP deator ination, turns out to be similar between the two regimes: it is generally not signicantly dierent from zero, except in the H-D regime where the eect is somewhat negative after one year. A weak response of prices to the government spending shock is in line with related research on the US.
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Figure 5 also shows that civilian employment tends to rise signicantly in the L-D regime following the news shock compared to the H-D regime, which instead shows a drop. This is also mirrored in the unemployment response, which falls below zero in the low disagreement scenario. The additional demand on the labour market appears to be reected in the upward movement of wages in the L-D regime. Indeed, real wages and total hours worked signicantly rise in the short-run following the news shock in the L-D scenario, whereas in the H-D scenario the response of wages remains muted. This nding adds to the literature addressing the eects of government spending shocks on real wages (e.g., Perotti, 2008 and Ramey, 2011a). Our results shows that, in response to the identied news shock on government spending, real wages tend to rise in the short-run and especially so in the L-D regime.
12 An average positive response of private investment to scal spending announcement is common to news-based identications (e.g., Ricco, 2015 , Forni and Gambetti, 2014 and Ben Zeev and Pappa, 2014 . 13 For example, Dupor and Li (2013) nds little evidence of a positive response of ination to government expenditure shocks in the US since WWII, even during the Federal Reserve's passive period . 
B.1 Summary Statistics and Tables for the Fiscal News
We report some summary statistics of the two news shocks used in the paper (nowcast and forecast revisions, dened N t (0) and N t (1, 3) as in the paper). We also show some statistics of the nowcast errors dened as (∆g t − E * t ∆g t ) (we label this variable here as M t ). The results reported below are largely drawn from Ricco (2015) . Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the the two news shocks and the nowcast error. Mean and median news and nowcast errors are reported as measures of the central tendency for the distribution of SPF individual forecasters data. We also present statistics for the second moments of the measures. From table 1 it emerges that: (i) nowcast errors have larger variance than the news variables; (iii) the mean of the news distribution is very close to zero; (ii) mean and median measures are very close, thus indicating that the distributions tend to be symmetric around zero.
Next, in Figure 11 we report the spectral densities for the government spending growth rate, and the SPF-implied measures of M t , N t (0) and N t (1, 3) . A few features of these charts are noteworthy: (i) the realised government spending growth rate has a concentrated mass at low frequencies (i.e., the so called typical spectral shape of macroeconomic variable, see e.g., Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003) ). This peak does not appear in the nowcast errors and news indicating that forecasters tend to correctly forecast slow moving components of spending while errors are concentrated at higher frequencies; (ii) SPF-implied nowcast To analyse the informational content of the news variable we (1) match peaks and through with a narrative of events, (2) perform an F-statistics to formally assess the explanatory power of SPF-implied scal news. Table 2 reports F-statistics for the SPF-implied scal news. We regress the real federal government consumption growth rate on the rst four lags of real federal government consumption, the average marginal tax rate, output, nonresidential xed investment, nondurable consumption real rates and on the current N (0) or the 4th lag of N (1, 3). The Table 2 : Explanatory power of SPF-implied scal news. The table reports marginal Fstatistics, coecients and t-statistics for the news variables. The real federal government consumption growth rate is regressed on lags 1 to 4 of real federal government consumption, the average marginal tax rate, output, nonresidential xed investment, nondurable consumption real rates and on the lag 0 of N (0) news variables provide information which is helpful in forecasting future and current government spending, even though the F statistics is below 10 and the SPF-implied news does not appear to be strong instruments.
B.2 Comparison with other Shocks used in the Literature
We compare our shocks with other measures of news proposed in the related literature.
Ramey ( table 3) . Also, it is interesting that the timing of recognisable increase in military spending (e.g., the Gulf War or the war in Afghanistan) is dierent. However, when comparing the series, it should be kept in mind that the forecast horizon of the Ramey military news variable is much longer than the one of the professional forecaster of the SPF dataset.
The second measure proposed in Ramey (2011b) is a measure of agents' forecast errors on government spending based on the median value of SPF forecasts of federal government spending. It is given by the dierence between realised government spending growth and the median expected government spending growth, one lag ahead. Formally, the Ramey's shocks are identied ltering through a VAR SPF forecast errors made at time t − 1 dened as: (∆g t − E * t−1 ∆g t ). Our news shocks also appear to be mildly correlated to tax changes as dened in Romer and Romer (2010) . They also appear to be weakly correlated to the Policy Uncertainty Index dened in Baker et al. (2012) As for the conditional prior of β, we adopt two prior densities used in the existing literature for the estimation of BVARs in levels: the Minnesota prior, introduced in Litterman (1979) , and the sum-of-coecients prior proposed in Doan et al. (1983) . The adoption of these two priors is based respectively on the assumption that each variable follows either a random walk process, possibly with drift, or a white noise process, and on the assumption of the presence of cointegration relationship among the macroeconomic variables. 15 The adoption of these priors has been shown to improve the forecasting performance of VAR models, eectively reducing the estimation error while introducing only relatively small biases in the estimates of the parameters (e.g. Sims and Zha (1996) • Minnesota prior: This prior is based on the assumption that each variable follows a random walk process, possibly with drift. This is quite a parsimonious, though reasonable approximation of the behaviour of economic variables. Following Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) , we set the degrees of freedom of the Inverse-Wishart distribution to d = n+2 which is the minimum value that guarantees the existence of the prior mean of Σ ε . 16 Moreover, we assume Ψ to be a diagonal matrix with n×1 elements ψ along the diagonal. The coecients A 1 , . . . , A 4 are assumed to be a priori independent. Under these assumptions, the following rst and second moments analytically characterise this prior:
15 Loosely speaking, the objective of these additional priors is to reduce the importance of the deterministic component implied by VARs estimated conditioning on the initial observations (see Sims (1996) ). 16 The prior mean of Σ ε is equal to
(20)
These can be cast in the form of (18). The coecients δ i that were originally set by Litterman were δ i = 1 reecting the belief that all the variables of interest follow a random walk. However, it is possible to set the priors in a manner that incorporates the specic characteristics of the variables. We set δ i = 0 for variables that in our prior beliefs follow a white noise process and δ i = 1 for those variables that in our prior beliefs follow a random walk process. We assume a diuse prior on the intercept. The factor 1/k 2 is the rate at which prior variance decreases with increasing lag length.
The coecient ϑ weights the lags of the other variables with respect to the variable's own lags. We set ϑ = 1. The hyperparameter λ controls the overall tightness of the prior distribution around the random walk or white noise process. A setting of λ = ∞ corresponds to the ordinary least squares estimates. For λ = 0, the posterior equals the prior and the data does not inuence the estimates.
The Minnesota prior can be implemented using Theil mixed estimations with a set of T d articial observations i.e., dummy observations 
where J p = diag(1, 2, ..., p).
17 In this setting, the rst block of dummies in the matrices imposes priors on the autoregressive coecients, the second block implements priors for the covariance matrix and the third block reects the uninformative prior for the intercept (ε is a very small number).
• Sum-of-coecients prior: To further favour unit roots and cointegration and to reduce the importance of the deterministic component implied by the estimation of the VAR conditioning on the rst observations, we adopt a renement of the Minnesota prior known as sum-of-coecients prior (Sims (1980) ). Prior literature has suggested that with very large datasets, forecasting performance can be improved by imposing additional priors that constrain the sum of coecients. To implement this procedure 17 This amounts to specifying the parameter of the Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior as
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we add the following dummy observations to the ones for the Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior:
y d = diag(δ 1 µ 1 , ...., δ n µ n )/τ x d = ((1 1×p ) ⊗ diag(δ 1 µ 1 , ...., δ n µ n )/τ 0 n×1 ) . In this set-up, the set of parameters µ aims to capture the average level of each of the variables, while the parameter τ controls for the degree of shrinkage and as τ goes to ∞, we approach the case of no shrinkage.
The joint setting of these priors depends on the set of hyperparameters γ ≡ {λ, τ, ψ, µ} that control the tightness of the prior information and that are eectively additional parameters of the model.
The adoption of these priors has been shown to improve the forecasting performance of VAR models, eectively reducing the estimation error while introducing only relatively small biases in the estimates of the parameters (e.g. Sims and Zha (1996) −1 x * y * andΨ = (y * − x * B ) (y * − x * B ). It is worth noting that the posterior expectations of the coecients coincide with the OLS estimates of a regression with variables y * and x * .
C.2 Within-regime IRFs and Inter-regimes GIRFs
In non-linear models the response of the system to disturbances potentially depends on the initial state, the size and the sign of the shock. In our TVAR model, in fact, the shock can trigger switches between regimes generating more complex dynamic responses to shocks than the linear mode. Because of this feature, the response of the model to exogenous shocks becomes dependent on the initial conditions and it is no more linear.
We study two sets of dynamic response to disturbances: impulse responses when the economy is assumed to remain in one regime forever (within-regime IRFs), and impulse responses when the switching variable is allowed to respond to shocks (inter-regime IRFs).
While the former set can be computed as standard IRFs, employing the estimated VAR coecients for a given regime, the latter must be studied using generalised impulse response functions (GIRFs), as in Pesaran and Shin (1998) .
For a TVAR(p), the GIRFs are dened as the change in conditional expectation of y t+i for i = 1, . . . , h GIRF y (h, ω t−1 , ε t ) = E [y t+h |ω t−1 , ε t ] − E [y t+h |ω t−1 ] , (25) due an exogenous shock ε t and given initial conditions ω 2. Using the coecients and errors from step 1 and initial conditions from the original dataset, GIRFs are computed.
3. Steps 1 to 3 are repeated Q times to generate an empirical distribution for the GIRFs, from which the coverage intervals are selected at the desired percentage level.
In our study we set R = 200, B = 300 and Q = 1000.
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